1. It looks like Democrats may have won the largest share of the national popular vote for the House since the post-Watergate election of 1974. This doesn’t necessarily mean that 2026 is the broadest national victory over that time; 2008 produced a bigger Senate majority while also giving Democrats control of the White House. But 2026 is definitely the greatest “overperformance,” far exceeding what were already favorable consensus expectations. The only comparable example might be 1980, when what most experts thought would be a tight race turned into a 44-state landslide victory for Ronald Reagan and a 12-seat gain for Republicans in the Senate. Expectations matter because they affect how electoral outcomes are received by political actors, and the results from last night have landed like a thunderbolt. Trump and his subordinates will no longer be treated by the political community as if they enjoy the trust of the typical American citizen, and the dilemma faced by other Republicans caught between loyalty to the president and desire to build a broader appeal will become a central storyline in our politics for at leas the next two years.
2. I’m just about the last person who would question the basic validity of thinking about American geography in terms of “red states” and “blue states.” But applying these labels too rigidly can be a mistake, especially in an unusual political environment in which normal patterns are put under rare strain. Yes, South Carolina is a red state, but if there’s a historically poor national climate for Republicans combined with an unappealing Republican candidate and an attractive Democratic opponent, the minority party has a real shot at winning. Much of the Washington political community tends to over-anchor its worldview around the results of the most recent election, when history shows that both short-term developments and longer trends act as constant sources of change.
3. There’s no shame in losing in a national landslide provoked by forces beyond your control. But a lot of Republican candidates this year didn’t even seem to realize how much trouble they might be in under very late—if they had, they would have invested more effort in broadening their appeal beyond the bounds of their party. Perhaps overconsumption of conservative media sources relentlessly promoting rosy scenarios left them unaware of their vulnerability? Watching Fox News Channel hosts struggle last night to understand how James Talarico and Gina Hinojosa could have possibly won in Texas—which anybody who has a professional job informing citizens about politics should have been previously aware was a strong possibility—suggests as much, even though “the president’s party takes a hit in the midterms” is about as reliable a rule as any in American electoral politics.
4. There’s a backlash to Big Tech happening all over the country. Candidates from coast to coast pledged this year to protect citizens from the evils of “data centers,” but that’s only one manifestation of a broader discomfort with economic disruption, threats to employment from AI, and the daily-life ubiquity of overfamiliar tech giants ruled by quirky, self-satisfied billionaires. The actual policy consequences of this trend are still unclear, but members of both parties have gotten the message that it’s good politics to give tech a hard time.
5. Many Americans hold a romantic view of grassroots organizing combined with a cynical belief that money can easily buy elections. This week’s results represent a challenge to both ideas. Democrats won a historic victory despite billions of dollars spent by Republican-aligned Super PACs on television advertising and the lack of a conscious national “movement” dedicated to aid Democratic candidates . Money and local organizing can both be important in politics, but neither is quite as important as people think.